Introduction
Economics has a long history of situations where agents have expost regrets from decisions made under uncertainty. In the now classic case of the winner's curse agents who have differing beliefs about an amenity value will find that in an auction the winner of the auction will be the bidder that overvalued that amenity. Capen, Clap and Cambell (1971) provide one of the first references to the winners curse looking at competitive bidding for oil leases, while Cassing and Douglas (1980) provides an example of the winner's curse in baseball free agency. More recently Lazear (2004) identifies the Peter Principle as a situation where individuals who are promoted may have been lucky in a stochastic sense and be promoted above their performance level.
Nowhere is the problem more pronounced than in the pursuit of talent.
Sports teams are in pursuit of the next Michael Jordan, movie studios in pursuit of the next Titanic, and music producers the next Beatles. Yet player after player, movie after movie, and singer after singer fall short and fail to meet expectations.
In the pursuit of superstars there are many false positives. We identify this problem as the dilemma of choosing talent. In section one; we model the dilemma of choosing talent when the distribution of talent is known to be from the upper portion of a talent distribution. In section two we test the theory using a panel study of players in the NBA from 1987-2003. We conclude with a discussion of the dilemma of choosing talent and how it relates to the economics of superstars.
Section 1: The Model
To formally model the problem of choosing talent consider what happens to the probability of finding high quality talent when the lower bound for high quality increases. Assume
• x* is the minimum level for high quality talent
• A potential employer observes a binary signal which is either favorable or unfavorable
Thus, from Bayes theorem we have:
Note prob(x > x*) = 1-F(x*) and prob(x<x*) = F(x*). Now suppose the probability of a favorable signals increases linearly in x: prob(favorable|x) = x/x H . This means those with x = x H have a probability of one of receiving a favorable signal; others have a smaller probability of a favorable signal.
We then can simplify eq.(1):
(1')
The denominator of (1') is the population mean of x, X .Clearly ∂P/∂x* is negative: the higher the level of talent desired (dx* > 0), the smaller the probability someone with a favorable signal exceeds the cut off for high talent (x*). Also ∂P/∂ X is negative: the more talented the population, on average, the smaller the probability someone with a favorable signal exceeds the cut off for high talent.
Note: these results do not depend on a "thin tail" at the upper end of the ability distribution; all we have specified is the distribution is continuous. For further insight, suppose x ~ uniformly on [ X -∆, X +∆]. We have:
Now ∂P/∂∆ < 0, so a larger variance of x (which is positively related to ∆) implies a smaller probability someone with a favorable signal exceeds the cut off for high talent. Suppose X = 6 & ∆ = 5. A firm that desired an above-average worker (x* = 6) would, choosing at random, obtain such a worker with a 50% probability. Using (1"), the signal would correctly identify such an individual 71% of the time. If the firm desired someone with x > 10, choosing at random, it would obtain such an individual 10% of the time. Using the signal, it would obtain such an individual 17.5% of the time.
Section 2: Empirical Results
To empirically test the model of the dilemma of choosing talent we focus on NBA data of performance from the 1987-88 season to the 2003-04 season. We use a measure of player performance called the efficiency formula to develop a distribution of talent. As reported by NBA.com, this index is calculated per game as: (points + rebounds + assists + steals + blocks) -((field goals attempted -field goals made) + (free throws attemptedfree throws made) + turnovers)). This measure provides a measure of quality that is based upon performance in all aspects of the games. In table 1, we report the mean, median, standard deviation and highest level of the efficiency rating. We find that in all cases the mean is higher than the median suggesting a skewed right distribution of talent.
We also find that the highest value is always over three standard deviations from the mean. In figure one we plot a distribution of efficiency ratios for the 2001-02 season.
The distribution is skewed right with only a few players in the top tail of the distribution.
In table 2, we focus on the players whose efficiency rating is two standard deviations from the mean. We find that from 12 to 22 players a year have efficiency ratings over two standard deviations from the mean in any given year. During this time period, we find that only two players who were in this elite category were undrafted, Ben In Table 4 Bryant were thirteenth picks in the draft). Overall the draft appears to represent either an efficient judge of talent or a self-fulfilling prophesy (teams may give number one picks more minutes and more opportunities to be a superstar).
In In table 6 we report these results. In regression I, draft number, experience, experience squared, years of college and race are all statistically significant determinants of efficiency; height and weight are not. As expected, efficiency declines as draft number rises. Efficiency initially rises with experience then declines. Efficiency declines as years of college rises; this reflects the early entry of outstanding college or high school players.
The negative coefficient for white players is interesting. A priori we would expect this coefficient to equal zero. The results suggest that white players may be drafted higher than the future performance would indicate. Regression II is run minus the white variable. There is no change in sign or significance of the remaining variables.
The R-square of the models is around 16%-17% overall. It is somewhat higher in explaining variation in efficiency between players, approximately 22 %, and between years for the same players, 23%. In general the results suggest a great deal of unexplained variation in player efficiency from season to season.
Conclusions
The dilemma of choosing talent suggests that when talent is thin more false positive signals exist than correct decisions. Using NBA data we find that there is much uncertainty in selecting talent. Our results also show that if superstars are found they are usually identified early, however, more false positive exist than correct decisions with high draft picks. Our results suggest that the dilemma of choosing talent is not so much a winner's curse but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket. Most times you lose but if you are going to win you must buy one. 84-3, 78-6, 84-5, 84-1, 83-14, 79-1, 85-13, 84-16, 80-3, 82-11 1988-1989 84-3, 79-1, 84-5, 84-1, 85-13, 83-14, 82-11, 85-1, 84-16, 87-7, 78-6, 85-7 1989-1990 84-3, 84-1, 85-1, 85-13, 84-5, 87-1, 79-1, 78-6, 84-16, 87-7, 85-7, 83-14, 82-11, 81-8 1990-1991 
